SEMINAR ON FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN - CLAWS

** The curious case of Chinese troops on Afghan soil

By Franz J. Marty

Overwhelming evidence – photographs, an eyewitness account and several confirming statements of diplomats and observers, among them a Chinese official familiar with the matter – leaves virtually no doubt that Chinese troops have undertaken joint patrols with their Afghan (and possibly also Tajik) counterparts on Afghan soil in the Little Pamir, a high plateau near the Afghan-Chinese border. While the Chinese source insists that such joint border patrols were based on an agreement, and therefore legal, the Afghan government steadfastly denies the existence of such patrols.


Background: China has shown and continues to show an increasing interest in Afghanistan (albeit still low compared to the West and Afghanistan's other neighbors). One specific focal point of China is the northeastern Afghan province of Badakhshan that shares a very short (76 kilometers) and remote border with the Chinese autonomous region of Xinjiang. This interest stems from Chinese concerns about illicit cross-border movements, in particular of alleged Uyghur extremists affiliated with the East Turkestan Islamic Movement – a group that is said to want to establish Islamic rule in Xinjiang, the homeland of the Uyghurs.

Accordingly, China has increased its involvement in this specific border region. On August 4, 2016, the inauguration of the so-called Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism stipulated a closer military co-operation between Afghanistan, Tajikistan, China and Pakistan; in September 2016 China signed an agreement with Tajikistan, pledging the construction of eleven outposts of different sizes and a training center for (Tajik) border guards along the Afghan-Tajik border; and during five days in late October 2016 China and Tajikistan reportedly held counterterrorism exercises in the Tajik part of the Wakhan Corridor – a narrow stretch of Afghan territory, wedged in between Tajikistan and Pakistan with the short border with China at its very end.

On the other hand, while China did announce certain examples of its deepening involvement in Afghanistan – for example, the first delivery of Chinese military aid to Afghanistan on July 3, 2016 – patrols with Chinese participation on Afghan soil in the Little Pamir were not publicly known until a media report broke the news on November 3, 2016. According to a Chinese official familiar with the issue, the report, which he termed misleading, resulted in the Afghan government's suspension of the joint patrols by the end of 2016. (A media report published on November 30, 2016, implied that a spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Defense had denied that such patrols were conducted; however, this was apparently a misinterpretation as the spokesman did not actually deny the patrols, but only said that "reports in foreign media of Chinese military vehicles patrolling inside Afghanistan do not accord with the facts" and added that "law enforcement bodies from China and Afghanistan, in accordance with a bilateral cooperation decision on strengthening border law enforcement, arranged to have joint law enforcement operations in border regions").

In any event, it should be kept in mind that – given that the border patrols in the Little Pamir indeed included Chinese vehicles (as seen on photographs and confirmed by various sources) – such patrols must have been conducted via Tajikistan. This derives from the fact that the high plateau of the Little Pamir can only be reached by vehicle from Tajikistan, as mountains without roads block the access for vehicles from the Afghan and Chinese sides.

Implications: While the initial media report on patrols with Chinese vehicles on Afghan soil in the Little Pamir suggested that such an incursion might amount to a breach of international law, this is questionable.

The Chinese official familiar with the matter openly confirmed the existence of such patrols to this author several times. Something he would hardly have done if the patrols were not based on some kind of permission from the Afghan side. In this regard, he emphasized that the patrols were jointly conducted by Afghan, Tajik and Chinese forces based on a corresponding agreement between those nations, and were therefore legal. While the source could not produce the document referred to, as it is reportedly classified, he claimed that it is an accord between the border guard forces of the involved three countries that explicitly stipulates joint patrols. Such patrols had been conducted for around a year on a monthly, sometimes even weekly basis, until Afghanistan suspended them in late 2016, the source added. This was partly corroborated by an eyewitness account, stating that the patrols in the Little Pamir were conducted by Chinese and Afghan border guards (while there was no mention of Tajiks, it is possible that the eyewitness could discern the Chinese troops, but not differentiate between Afghan and Tajik border guards). The eyewitness report furthermore indicated that the Afghan Border Police stationed in the Little Pamir cooperated with Chinese troops, meaning that they apparently did not perceive the Chinese presence on Afghan territory as illegal.

Confronted with all the evidence, Sediq Sediqi, the spokesman of the Afghan Ministry of Interior Affairs, which is also responsible for the Afghan Border Police, nevertheless insisted that no Chinese troops had ever patrolled on Afghan soil in the Little Pamir. Sediqi conceded that there is indeed a border cooperation agreement between Afghanistan, Tajikistan and China, but staunchly asserted that such an agreement does not provide any basis for joint border patrols. Equally peculiar, a well-placed Tajik source could not confirm such joint border patrols.

Given that neither Sediqi nor other Afghan authorities gave more information on this matter, but that the overwhelming evidence leaves virtually no doubt that patrols involving Chinese vehicles and troops were indeed conducted, one can only speculate about the reasons for the Afghan denial. One possibility could be that the central government in Kabul was not aware of what happened in the very remote Little Pamir or that certain Afghan officials (local, regional or national) knew about the patrols and maybe even gave permission to the Chinese side, but did not properly notify other responsible Afghan authorities. And in case there has been an agreement on such patrols, it cannot be ruled out that such an agreement was not correctly concluded. However, this cannot be assessed due to the lack of information.

In any event, while this curious episode of Chinese troops in the Little Pamir might have some ramifications on Afghan-Sino relations, Afghanistan's interest in Chinese aid as well as China's focus on border security in the region will most likely limit its impact.

With respect to Chinese concerns about illicit cross-border activities on the Afghan-Chinese border, it should also be kept in mind that such concerns are highly exaggerated. The Afghan-Chinese border lies in extremely remote mountains and can only be crossed through two passes. However, both passes are located on altitudes of nearly 16,500 feet (5,000 meters) above the sea level and are hardly accessible – far away from any settlement with not even footpaths leading to them. Therefore, crossing the border illegally might be possible, but hardly usable as a corridor. Indirectly corroborating this, the Chinese source confirmed that the joint border patrols were conducted on the high plateau, far away from the actual border in the mountains, as those areas were simply too difficult to access.

Moreover, despite the frequent allegations that Uyghur extremists are present in Afghanistan, the Chinese government (as well as the Chinese source) has not presented even an estimated number of such Uyghurs, whereas various knowledgeable sources indicate that their presence in Afghanistan is likely insignificantly small. In addition, the same sources indicate that the Uyghur extremists that reside in Afghanistan probably migrated to the country a long time ago (most likely during the Taliban regime in the late 1990s), casting doubt both on their actual intention to return to China and, even if they would, their prospective influence and/or capabilities in Xinjiang.

Conclusions: Given all the evidence, there is virtually no doubt that border patrols with Chinese participation were conducted on Afghan soil in the Little Pamir, but have by now most likely been suspended. Nonetheless, the Afghan government steadfastly denies that such patrols have ever existed. In the absence of any apparent explanation for the Afghan government's stance, there can be no final conclusion. However, the circumstances imply that the Afghan government either does not know exactly what happens in the Little Pamir and/or that the procedure to establish such joint patrols was deeply flawed. Both options raise worrisome questions about the performance of the Afghan government.

Author's bio: Franz J. Marty is a freelance journalist, currently based in Afghanistan. He covers a broad range of topics, but focuses on security and military issues. He can be followed @franzjmarty on twitter.



8 FEBRUARY 2017


Long-awaited TAPI pipeline to finally see light of day in Pak this month


A team from Turkmenistan will reach Islamabad on February 14 to begin work on the route survey, engineering and feasibility study to implement the TAPI pipeline project.

Work on the long-awaited 1,680 km Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline will begin in Pakistan this month, a senior Pakistani official has said.

Leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India performed the ground-breaking of the project in December 2015. The project would help ease energy deficiency in South Asia.

The Express Tribune newspaper reported that the Tapi Company, having the mandate to run the pipeline, has awarded the project management consultant (PMC) contract to German firm ILF.

Pakistan's Inter State Gas Systems Managing Director Mobin Saulat told the daily that the consultant was ready to conduct route survey, detailed engineering and feasibility study this month.

"A team from Turkmenistan will reach Islamabad on February 14 to begin work on the route survey, engineering and feasibility study to implement the TAPI pipeline project," he said.

The team will first start work in Pakistan and then it will proceed to Afghanistan.

"Pipeline construction and gas-field development has started in Turkmenistan and we appreciate efforts of Turkmenistan authorities to expedite the project," said Saulat.


He said Pakistan had reiterated its firm commitment and continued to provide full support for the TAPI pipeline.

Efforts to achieve financial closure were going on and the project would be commissioned as per schedule, he said.

Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India have already signed a $10-billion investment agreement for the TAPI pipeline in a bid to kick off activities, update feasibility study and finalise pipeline route in Afghanistan.

According to the agreement, Turkmenistan will invest around $25 billion to deliver 3.2 billion cubic feet of gas per day (bcfd) to energy-hungry Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Of the total, $15 billion will be invested in developing the gas field whereas $10 billion will be poured into laying the pipeline over 1,680 km connecting Afghanistan, Pakistan and India with Turkmenistan.

Officials said a consortium of Japanese companies was working on a fast-track basis to develop the gas field in Turkmenistan.

A gas sale and purchase agreement had already been inked in 2013 to set the pricing mechanism under which the gas price at Turkmenistan border would be around 20 per cent cheaper than the price of Brent crude.

Pakistan and India will receive 1.325 bcfd of gas each while Afghanistan would get 500 mmcfd.

6 FEBRUARY 2017


* IG Report: Taliban Have Captured 15% of All Districts in Afghanistan Since 2015

 By SIGAR,
The Afghan government "has lost territory to the insurgency" and "district control continues to decline," the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) said in its most recent quarterly report to United States Congress. An estimated 15 percent of Afghanistan's districts have slipped from the government's control over that time period.

The picture is more bleak than what the Obama administration and top military commanders have let on when looked at from a longer distance. According to SIGAR, the Afghan government controls or influences just 52 percent of the nation's districts today compared to 72 percent in Nov. 2015.

"SIGAR's analysis of the most recent data provided by US Forces in Afghanistan (USFOR-A) suggests that the security situation in Afghanistan has not improved this quarter," the watchdog group noted in its most recent assessment of the country. "The numbers of the Afghan security forces are decreasing, while both casualties and the number of districts under insurgent control or influence are increasing."

"[T]he ANDSF [Afghan National Defense and Security Forces] has not yet been capable of securing all of Afghanistan and has lost territory to the insurgency," since the last reporting period. The Afghan government has lost control of more than six percent of Afghanistan's 407 districts since SIGAR issued its last report, on Oct. 30.

According to SIGAR, the insurgency, which is overwhelmingly made up of the Taliban, now controls nine districts and influences another 32, while 133 districts are "contested." USFOR-A defines contested districts as "having 'negligible meaningful impact from insurgents,' contending that neither the insurgency nor the Afghan government maintains significant control over these areas."

The names of the Taliban controlled and influenced districts, as well as those that are contested, were not disclosed by USFOR-A or SIGAR. However, according to SIGAR:

The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeast Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for 16 of the 41 districts (or 31.7%) under insurgent control or influence.

"Less strategic importance"

The US military justified the loss of territory by claiming the Afghan government's "new Sustainable Security Strategy" calls for abandoning districts that are "not important."

"USFOR-A attributes the loss of government control or influence over territory to the ANDSF's strategic approach to security prioritization, identifying the most important areas that the ANDSF must hold to prevent defeat, and focusing less on areas with less strategic importance," SIGAR reported. "Under its new Sustainable Security Strategy, the ANDSF targets 'disrupt' districts for clearance operations when the opportunity arises, but will give first priority to protecting 'hold' and 'fight' districts under its control."

This strategy neglects the fact that the Taliban views rural districts or those "with less strategic importance" as critical to its insurgency. The Taliban uses theses districts to raise funds, recruit and train fighters, and launch attacks on population centers. Additionally, Taliban allies such as al Qaeda run training camps and operate bases in areas under Taliban control. This strategy was explained by Mullah Aminullah Yousuf, the Taliban's shadow governor for Uruzgan, in April 2016.

The Taliban has utilized its control of the rural districts to directly threaten major population centers. Last year, the Taliban was able to threaten five of Afghanistan's 34 provincial capitals. The government lost control of Kunduz for more than a week last fall.

US military underestimates Taliban control and contested districts

FDD's Long War Journal has maintained that the US military's assessment of the state of play in Afghanistan's districts is flawed. Our study estimates the Taliban controls 42 Afghan districts and contests (or influences) another 55. [Note: USFOR-A's definition of "influence" matches our definition of "contested." The term "influenced/contested" will be used for clarity to describe these districts. LWJ does not assess districts that are defined by USFOR-A as "contested," which means neither the Taliban or Afghan government hold sway.]

The number of Taliban controlled and influenced/contested districts has risen from 70 in October 2015 to 97 this month.

Districts under Taliban command are typically being administered by the group, or the group controls the district center. Additionally, districts where the district center frequently changes hands are considered Taliban-controlled. In influenced/contested districts, the Taliban dominates all of the areas of a district except the administrative center.

A map created by LWJ [below] lists the districts thought to be controlled [black] or influenced/contested [red] by the Taliban. LWJ believes that the Taliban controls and contests more districts displayed on the map above, however the districts listed on the map are ones that can be confirmed via independent sources such as Taliban claims, US and Afghan government reports, and news reports. For instance, the Taliban has traditionally held significant sway in many districts in eastern and northeastern Afghanistan, however the status of these districts cannot be properly assessed based on open source information.

Without USFOR-A's list of Taliban controlled or influenced/contested districts, it is difficult to compare the discrepancies between the US military and LWJ's assessments. However, USFOR-A did provide information on one province which reveals that the military is providing a best-case scenario of the situation on the ground.

USFOR-A claims, according to SIGAR, that "The region with the most districts under insurgent control or influence is centered on northeast Helmand Province and northwestern Kandahar Province, and includes the Helmand/Kandahar border area, Uruzgan Province, and northwestern Zabul. This region alone accounts for 16 of the 41 districts (or 31.7%) under insurgent control or influence."

While this geographic area is poorly defined, LWJ estimates that 24 districts are controlled (12) or influenced/contested (12) in the four provinces mentioned (Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Zabul). This means that the Taliban, based on USFOR-A's estimate, controls or influences/contests only 17 districts through the remaining 30 provinces. However the Taliban is known to control or influence/contest multiple districts in the provinces of Kunduz, Baghlan, Badghis, Faryan, Sar-i-Pul, Takhar, Jawzjan, Kapisa, Badakhshan, Nuristan, Kunar, Paktia, Paktika, Wardak, Logar, Ghazni, Ghor, Farah, and Herat.

Top military commanders have downplayed the Taliban's gains over the past year. General John Nicholson, the commander of NATO's Resolute Support and US Forces-Afghanistan, characterized the fact that 30 percent of the Afghan population is controlled or contested by the Taliban as a "positive" development, as the Taliban is primarily operating in the rural areas of Afghanistan. [See FDD's Long War Journal report, US commander in Afghanistan downplays Taliban control of 10 percent of population.] 

Bill Roggio is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Editor of FDD's Long War Journal.


The Never Ending Story: The Morass of Afghanistan and Pakistan

FEBRUARY 15, 2017 | KEVIN HULBERT

KEVIN HULBERT
The new administration must surely be thinking about the challenges of Afghanistan and Pakistan and what to do.  The region has bedeviled outsiders for generations.  Afghanistan perplexed Alexander the Great, got the best of the British, beat up on the Soviet Union, and now it's befuddled U.S. Presidents Barack Obama for the last eight years and George W. Bush for most of the eight years before that.  While Obama had originally hoped to end our long U.S. military efforts in Afghanistan, he wound up going sideways over the last few years, grudgingly maintaining about 10,000 non-combat mission troops on the ground. 
What might the new Trump administration do?  On the good side, you have Secretary of Defense James Mattis and National Security Advisor Michael Flynn in the administration, and those two men have deep experience in the area.  On the bad side, you unfortunately have a situation that frankly does not have any good answers.   These are difficult foreign policy challenges for the U.S. (and the world), and ones where there are no real "solutions" to implement – only a slate of bad options from which you are going to have to choose something and try to make it work.  
In Afghanistan, we have now had U.S. military forces in the country for over 15 years.  What is the plan?  Is there a plan?  Are we getting out?  Staying forever?  Combat operations ended at the end of 2014. 
There seem to only be two broad choices in Afghanistan for the new Commander in Chief – and both choices have serious downsides:   
  1. Stay the course and continue to spend tens of billions of dollars on Afghanistan every year, paying billions to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and billions to Afghanistan to support the Afghan National Army and other institutions.  The only real mission today is to stop the country from falling to the Taliban and to prevent Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for terrorists who might plan attacks against the West.  Meanwhile, if we stay, the death toll for the U.S. continues as the casualties dribble in.
  2. Pull out, save tens of billions of dollars, save some lives, but despite our best efforts to build an effective government and military in Afghanistan over the last 15 years, the country will probably fall to the Taliban in 30 days after we leave, causing a lot of people to wonder why we spent all that blood and treasure on Afghanistan.  Then, the country will likely become a terrorist safe haven, too. 
There is a third way: withdraw U.S. troops, but have the U.S. Intelligence Community monitor the area much more closely than it did in say, 2001, to ensure that Afghanistan does not again become a terrorist safe haven and to take decisive action if it does.  This course of action is admittedly easier said than done.  There is the added concern that if you lose the big U.S. military footprint, you'd have a real force protection issue, and it would be exceedingly difficult for others to stay in the country in large numbers. Further, you would be at risk of losing the entire (alleged) Predator program. 
In James Mattis' written testimony for his confirmation to be Secretary of Defense, when asked, "What are the U.S. national security interests and objectives in Afghanistan and what strategy to you recommend to achieve them?" his answer was a succinct, "We all remember what it felt like on 9/11 and 9/12.  We should do what is necessary to prevent such an attack from occurring again." 
So, it might appear that the writing is on the wall: We're likely to stay in Afghanistan, stuck there in a non-combat role, ensuring that the country never again becomes a safe haven for terrorists. 
How much money have we spent in Afghanistan, and further, should we just keep on spending money there forever?  To the first question, nobody really knows how much the war in Afghanistan has cost.  You can add up all of the funding specifically approved by congress for the Afghan war through fiscal year 2017, but that only gives you a very partial understanding of the total costs.  But, whatever the total, it is surely a number that is both staggering and disheartening.  Some estimates put the total at over a trillion dollars.  Others say it was "just" many hundreds of billions.  The Congressional Research Service recently soberly opined that the cost of keeping one U.S. soldier in Afghanistan was approximately $3.9 million a year.  It seems untenable to keep doing this forever and at some point, we are going to have to think about bringing our troops home and letting the chips fall where they may. 
They don't call it the graveyard of empires for nothing. 
Pakistan represents an entire other host of issues.  Pakistan is like the bank that is "too big to fail," or "too big to allow to fail" more appropriately, because allowing the bank to fail could have catastrophic impacts on the greater economy.   The "failure" of Pakistan would have implications for the world.  We have big problems in Afghanistan with its population of 33 million people, but Pakistan has about 182 million inhabitants, over five times the size of Afghanistan. 
With a failing economy, rampant terrorism, the fastest growing nuclear arsenal, the sixth largest population, and one of the highest birthrates in the world, Pakistan is of grave concern.  But, what should we do? 
The U.S. has given Pakistan tens of billions of dollars in aid, coalition support funds, and International Monetary Fund loans over the last 15 years because they helped us on terrorism, they helped us in Afghanistan (albeit not always as much as we had hoped), and because the specter of Pakistan collapsing presents the U.S. President with more nightmare scenarios than probably any other country in the world.  So, we keep throwing money at it, trying to steer them towards good behavior, and with only limited success. But, we must keep trying.   In the end, while Pakistan is not the most dangerous country in the world, it probably is the most dangerous country for the world.
There seem few levers to pull in Pakistan today, but if we pursue a strategy of containment or disengagement, things will only get worse.  I used to brief U.S. policymakers that Pakistan had the very unique distinction of being both one of our best partners on counterterrorism and one of our worst partners on counterterrorism— all at the same time.   Imperfect partners though they are, writing Pakistan off would be a big mistake because then we would lose the ability to work together with Pakistan on various efforts in that troubled region.

Russia Gathers Stakeholders, Sans U.S. or NATO, for Afghanistan Conference

ISLAMABAD — Russia is hosting a conference in Moscow this week that will bring together Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, India and Iran to discuss a possible solution of the conflict in Afghanistan.
This meeting is part of Russia's effort at playing a more pro-active role in Afghanistan for the first time since its invasion of the country in 1979. Its efforts, however, have encountered controversies at the very outset.
The last conference Moscow hosted on Afghanistan in December included only China and Pakistan, prompting a strong protest from the Afghan government.
The one this week is more inclusive of the regional stakeholders, but excludes the United States or NATO, leading to speculation that Russia is more interested in undermining the Unites States than in solving the regional problems.
At a recent Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, Chairman Senator John McCain said Russia is propping up the Taliban to undermine the U.S.
"Given how troubling the situation is in Afghanistan, any efforts by any outside stakeholder to look for regional solutions to the war there should be welcomed," said Michael Kugelman, deputy Asia director at the Washington based Wilson Center. The question he asked, however, was what is Russia trying to do.
"Is it genuinely trying to rally the key players to come up with an actionable plan to wind down the war? Or is it just trying to scale up its role in Afghanistan to undercut U.S. influence?"
Other regional analysts, however, are looking at the development with more optimism.
"This framework does include all the regional players that have a major stake in Afghanistan," according to Amina Khan of the Institute for Strategic Studies Islamabad, a Pakistani government run think tank.
"Terrorism is a global phenomena but I think regional countries need to play a more pro-active role," she added.
At the last trilateral, Russia's primary focus was on the presence of the Islamist militant group Islamic State in Eastern Afghanistan. Moscow does not want its influence to spread to the Muslim population in the Caucasus bordering Russia.
However, Gen. John Nicholson, the man leading the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, told the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee recently that Russia is trying to "publicly legitimize the Taliban" with a "false narrative" that the Taliban is fighting Islamic State, not the Afghan government.
However, Russia is not the only country in the region worried about IS influence and using the Taliban as a hedge. Iran also has started supporting the Taliban to keep IS influence away from areas bordering Iran. China has had contacts with the Taliban for a while, hosting several secret meetings between the Taliban and Afghan government officials or peace envoys.
Expectations from the upcoming conference, meanwhile, are low at this stage.
"The fact that three countries have been added to the list at this point for the first time means it's still going to be in the initial stages of getting to know each other, and getting to hear each other's narrative and try to make sense of it. I don't see anything big coming out of this," said Omar Samad, former Afghan ambassador to the U.S.
Several similar efforts have fallen victim to the tension and mistrust between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Whether this process succeeds, will depend on whether Russia and China can persuade the two to work out their differences.

U.S. Commander Warns of Russian, Iranian, Pakistani Influence in Afghanistan

Paul Alexander, Voice of America
Gen. John Nicholson, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Feb. 9, 2017, before the Senate Armed Services Senate Committee.
WASHINGTON - The top U.S. commander in Afghanistan says Russia, Pakistan and Iran are pursuing their own agendas with regard to the fragile country, complicating the fight against terrorism and extremism.
"We're concerned about outside actors," General John Nicholson told VOA's Afghan service in an interview.
Russia, which had an ill-fated intervention into Afghanistan that started in 1979 and ended nearly a decade later, has been trying to exert influence in the region again and has set up six-country peace talks next week that are excluding the United States. Nicholson worries about Russia's links with the Taliban.
"Russia has been legitimizing the Taliban and supporting the Taliban," he said. "Meanwhile, the Taliban supports terrorists. I'm very sorry to see Russia supporting the Taliban and narcoterrorism."
Moscow denies that it provides aid to the Taliban and says its contacts with the group are aimed at encouraging them to enter peace talks.
Taliban Role in Peace Efforts
Despite the Taliban's history of violence and extremism, Nicholson didn't rule out a role for the Taliban in the peace process, saying there were elements in the group that appeared to be more pragmatic about the country's prospects for peace.
"Many of its leaders see a better life for all Afghans," he said.
Meanwhile, he said Iran appeared to be supporting extremists in western Afghanistan.
"But the situation is more complex than with Russia," Nicholson said. "There needs to be a relationship" between Afghanistan and Iran, which have seen a resurgence in trade that has partially compensated for a decline in Afghan economic activity with Pakistan.
President Donald Trump's new administration has made a flurry of contacts with top Afghan and Pakistani officials in recent days as it formulates a new policy in the region. That clearly involves pressure on Islamabad to do more to crack down on terrorist groups that hide out near the Afghan border in Pakistan's volatile tribal areas.
"We want cooperation from Pakistan against all terrorists," Nicholson said. "We must have pressure on external sanctuaries in Pakistan."
Rooting out terrorists would help ease Pakistan's concerns about further attacks on its turf that are seen by many as a penalty for the country's support for the U.S. war on terrorism, he said.
"We all hope for a change in Pakistani behavior," Nicholson said. "This is in Pakistan's interest."
Congressional Appearance
The general spoke shortly after appearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, where he said he needed "a few thousand" more soldiers to bolster the 8,400 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
Nicholson told VOA that the extra troops would serve as advisers, extending that role from the core of the Afghan military down to the brigade level to help the country's troops in what he called a "very, very tough fight" to foster peace.
"The enemy is trying to seize cities," he said. "It's a new dimension to the fight."
The Afghan military has suffered heavy losses as a result. More than 6,700 of its soldiers were killed last year through November 12, according to a quarterly report from the U.S. government's Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, up from 6,600 for all of 2015.
Nicholson discounted recent figures that indicated the Taliban has gained more territory this year and now holds about 15 percent of the land, saying it was the result of a revised Afghan government strategy to focus on protecting urban areas.
"This was a wise decision by the government," he said, adding that it had provided greater protection for most of the people. "There's a difference between territory and population. Many areas are sparsely populated."
Propaganda War
U.S.-led forces also have been losing ground in the propaganda war waged by the Taliban and the 20 terrorist groups that operate in Afghanistan, who aggressively use social media, often with false reports that put the international mission in a bad light, Nicholson said.
He sought advice from VOA journalists on the best ways to counter the extremists' message and recruitment efforts, saying "the enemy" was doing a better job than the government and its allies at reaching the Afghan people. "We're trying to be more proactive in communications," he said.
The U.S. has been in Afghanistan for more than 15 years and has committed to at least four more years. But Nicholson said even though the internal fight is currently at a "stalemate," the battle is worthwhile. He added that he did see a peaceful future for the country.
"I believe it will end well for the Afghan people," he said. "Our Afghan brothers and sisters are worth our support."



--

Whatever happened in the past, it happened for the good; Whatever is happening, is happening for the good; Whatever shall happen in the future, shall happen for the good only. Do not weep for the past, do not worry for the future, concentrate on your present life.
What did you bring at the time of birth, that you have lost? What did you produce,  which is destroyed? You didn't bring anything when you were born. Whatever you have, you have received it from the God only while on this earth. Whatever you will give, you will give it to the God. Everyone came in this world empty handed and shall go the same way. Everything belongs to God only.Whatever belongs to you today, belonged to someone else earlier and shall belong to some one else in future. Change is the law of the universe.You are an indestructible Soul & not a body. Body is composed of five elements - Earth, Fire, Water, Air and Sky; one day body shall perish in these elements.



Maj Gen PK Mallick, VSM (Retd)

From: pradyot mallick <mallinkdada@gmail.com>
Date: 14 February 2017 12:11:57 AM GMT+05:30
To: undisclosed-recipients:;
Subject: SEMINAR ON FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND EFFECT ON REGIONAL DYNAMICS org by CLAWS

1.  Tomorrow there is a seminar on FUTURE OF AFGHANISTAN SECURITY DYNAMICS AND EFFECT ON REGIONAL DYNAMICS org by CLAWS.

2.  I recommend people attending the seminar or who are interested ion matters Afghanistan, to click on  AFPAK Page of my blog site at http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.in/search/label/AfPak

3.  You will find articles like the following :

4.  Meanwhile why don't you read these  :



   --  PKM

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